Once upon a time the humble borrower would apply to a bank (or building society – remember those?) for a mortgage and the financial institution would assess their creditworthiness and advance a loan. The debt would sit on the bank’s books until term, when the borrower’s repayments would pay off the debt plus compound interest, unless the borrower defaulted, in which case the bank would repossess the borrower’s property and suffer any loss.
Then along came securitisation.
Now banks could take their borrowers’ IOUs and bundle them into mortgage-backed securities which could be sold on to willing buyers. In this way they could clear much of this debt off their books and ensure a steady income. As credit controls were lifted and debt flooded into the property market, derived demand for housing grew, creating a classics a Minsky-style asset-price feedback loop – as house prices rose, so demand increased, creating more debt, higher prices, more demand, and repeat until well cooked . . .
Pretty soon, banks could see they were on a one-way bet, with rising house prices providing a cushion against the occasional default. And, anyway, by the time any defaults occurred, the debt would have been sold on . . . and on . . . In short, they were no longer left holding the baby.
As mortgage origination became a sure way to make risk-free money, so more players entered the market, and standards started to be relaxed. Did it really matter if the borrower was lying about their income? If they could keep up payments long enough for the originator to sell on the loan it would be somebody else’s problem. And, with house prices rising, the collateral was sufficient to cover the losses.
Meanwhile as Mortgage-Backed Securities were bundled into Collateralised Debt Obligations, then sliced into different levels of risk, there was something for everyone. Pension funds could take the most secure AAA tranches, while those looking for higher yields could take a risk with the junk end of the market.
But the really clever trick was to take that lowest tranche and reconstitute it into a CDO2 – with the least-worst being re-graded as AAA by the ratings agencies (paid for their services by the banks who held the CDOs!) – creating a latter-day philosopher’s stone capable of turning base metal into gold.
Moreover, with the explosion of Credit Default Swaps, any residual risk could be offset by buying insurance against default (even though ‘insurers’ like AIG weren’t sufficiently capitalised to underwrite that risk). Magically, risk had been virtually eradicated from the risk models.
So, it was no surprise that, with rising property prices and seemingly risk-free investment opportunities, demand for the products of these latter-day alchemists soared.
The problem now was supply, the housing market was becoming saturated, families with no income, no jobs and no assets were encouraged to take on ‘teaser’ loans, but where do you go from there?
The answer was ‘synthetic CDOs’. No longer would you need new real-world mortgages to bundle up and sell, you could simply ‘reference’ existing CDOs and sell on derivatives of derivatives, creating an endless supply of virtually risk-free investment.
The only problem was . . .
When banks loan out money for mortgages, they don’t take it from depositors, they create it from nothing. The debt is simply the corollary of a promise to pay from the borrower, increasing the money supply until it is paid off. But, with compound interest, the arithmetic starts to get interesting as more money must be created than the original loan if the interest is ever to be paid off. As that interest accrues, so the whole system takes on the characteristics of a giant Ponzi scheme, with more borrowers required to enter the market to keep the process in motion.
However, as those sub-prime chickens start to roost on the hen-house and defaults mount, it gets harder to refloat the repossessions (incidentally, the myth that has grown up that government efforts to force mortgage lenders to consider riskier loans because it helped the poor onto the housing ladder is exploded by the statistic that 80% of sub-prime mortgages went to existing home-owners using their property as an ATM). As house prices start to slide with fewer new entrants into an over-heated market the asset-price feedback loop starts to go into reverse. But the interest on the debt, and the interest on the interest continues to accrue. So, while debt levels increase and income levels stagnate (or, in the current case of Greece in particular, are slashed), the maths no longer makes any sense. Pretty soon much of the debt created by banks out of thin air becomes unserviceable.
Defaults rise, the bubble starts to collapse. Banks are left holding CDOs which are virtually worthless. Calls on their Credit Default Swaps start to rise. CDS ‘underwriters’ like AIG realise they don’t have the capital to stay in business. Clients like Goldman Sachs know that if those payments aren’t made they will soon be underwater.
The banking system freezes as banks refuse to lend . . . to each other! Like traders on a market stall who have stacked the bottom of their baskets with rotten fruit, they know that those CDOs, which look so juicy on the surface, are well past their sell-by date. Trust, that essential lubricant of markets has evaporated.
The whole banking system is on the verge of collapse. Who you gonna call?
Then you remember, Hank Paulson, the US Secretary to the Treasury is an ex-CEO of Goldman Sachs. His friends in government, like James Rubin, Larry Summers and everyone’s favourite Ayn Rand disciple Alan Greenspan, are likewise Wall St. alumni.
What if you could persuade them to offload all that debt onto the public accounts? It doesn’t take much arm-twisting. Pretty soon the government is plying the banks with billions of taxpayers’ future income – like there’s . . . er . . . no tomorrow. They buy up the toxic assets, or insure the banks against future losses on those assets. It’s the only way to Save the World.
A sigh of relief all round.
Except . . .
All those debts that were unserviceable in the private sector now look unserviceable in the public sector. Well, say the banks, you should’ve thought of that. Yes, say the markets, it was totally irresponsible for government to hold so much debt – it amounts to a sovereign debt crisis.
That’s the problem, say the ratings agencies, government has too much debt – we’re going to have to downgrade your creditworthiness – as a result you will owe the banks even more money for bailing them out.
Well, say the heads of government in unison, then we’re just going to have to cut back on our profligate spending on healthcare, education and pensions to make more room for debt repayment. If it means raiding the incomes of the sick and disabled, well, these are tough times, calling for tough decisions. We’re all in this together, or, at least, YOU’RE all in this together.
Somehow, I don’t think there’s going to be a happy ending.
“Debts that cannot be repaid, won’t be repaid.” - Michael Hudson.